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This study considers the consequences of Inter Organisational relations at two levels: the micro level of the individual, and the macro
level of the organisation. Merging Transaction Cost Economics with theories on the Social Embeddedness of relations, the paper tackles
several hypotheses about problems in buyer–supplier relations. We amend the general hypothesis, as has been put forward by other
researchers, that having a common past in combination with an expected common future in business will reduce the likelihood that
problems and conﬂicts occur. Our focus lies on whether this shared past and future can preclude problems better when the organisational
relations are at the micro level. Our analyses of survey data from 448 contractor–subcontractor relations from the contractor’s
perspective in the construction industry reveal mixed support for effects of a shared past or future. We hardly ﬁnd any of the expected
positive effects of a shared past on supplier performance. However, we do ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that a larger likelihood of
future business with the same business partner has a stronger (negative) effect on the occurrence of problems if the expected future
business is at the level of individuals (instead of at the level of organisations).
r 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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In many studies on inter-organisational relationships,
researchers refer to the so-called shadow of the past and/or
the shadow of the future (e.g. Heide & Miner, 1992; Heide &
Stump, 1995; Batenburg et al., 2003). Both are considered
part of what is called the temporal embeddedness of a
relationship. Under the shadow of the past, past experi-
ences with the other party are assumed to play their
role in determining the type of behaviour towards that
party. The shadow of the future is largely determined by
the expected likelihood that partners meet again in the
future. The general gist of the argument is that, in case of
high temporal embeddedness, opportunistic behaviour ise front matter r 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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erk.welling@12move.nl (D.T. Welling).assumed, ceteris paribus, to be less likely. Learning from
the partner’s behaviour in the past enables more effective
and efﬁcient selection and planning, while an expected
common future induces control, because of the possibility
for the other party to retaliate; ‘tit-for-tat’ (I will treat you
as you treat me).
Although in theoretical experiments temporal embedd-
edness seems to have a positive impact on cooperation
(Axelrod, 1984), many empirical studies found only partial
or even a total lack of support for this claim. Elsewhere
(Welling & Kamann, 2001, 2003; Kamann and Welling,
2004), we pointed at a possible cause for this lack of
support. Most studies look at inter-organisational relations
only at the organisational level; that is, they do not check
whether indeed Mr A of Company 1 is likely to meet Mr B
of Company 2 again in the future, but only whether
Company 1 is likely to do business with Company 2 in
the future, irrespective of the identity of the actual
individuals involved. We can illustrate the usefulness of
distinguishing individual or micro level contacts from
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construction industry. In the construction industry, the
project leader and/or foreman play a very important role in
(a) the supplier selection part of the purchasing process; (b)
the day-to-day contacts and progress of the construction
project. Especially in cases where the sub-contractor’s
services are interwoven with the processes of the construc-
tion project as a total project, project leaders have an
important say in the supplier selection. One of the reasons
for this is that in these cases, lack of cooperation at the
micro level immediately results in additional project costs.
In combination with this, another reason for the distinction
is that, as Welling and Kamann (2001) demonstrated, in
many industries in which deals are often project based—
such as the construction industry—individual actors such
as project leaders do not necessarily meet the same person
they have done business again, even in cases where the two
companies do collaborate again at an organisational level.
Our hypothesis is that from a theoretical point of view it
matters whether we study inter-organisational relations
from the level of the individual—the micro level—or from
the level of the total organisation – the macro level.
Similarly, other levels in between could be identiﬁed, such
as the level of Business Units or departments: the meso
level. The point is that, necessarily, the more aggregate the
level is, the less likely it is that actors have personal
experiences with their counterparts. The more aggregate
the level of interaction, the more important information
systems are that store information about the reliability and
general compliance of counterparts to expectations and
contracts, common in an organisation. These systems
might substitute personal memory and represent the
organisational memory about third parties and the way
they behave. To rely on these systems actually assumes that
a third party will behave identically with everybody from
the focal organisation we study, irrespective of personal
favours or dislikes. In any case, the differences in the
levels of aggregation across different studies is a pos-
sible explanation as to why some studies ﬁnd effects of
temporal embeddedness on business interaction, whereas
others do not.
To deal with this issue from a theoretical point of view,
a theoretical framework was developed (Kamann and
Welling, 2004), combining the traditional transactional
views of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) with those of
Social Embeddedness (cf. Buskens et al., 2003) and
drawing from the ideas and studies of the GREMI-Group
(Camagni, 1991) and the IMP-School (Axelsson and
Easton, 1992). From this framework—to be summarised
hereafter—a number of hypotheses are derived, with
respect to the role of the temporal embeddedness,
especially on combination with personal network relational
embeddedness. Hence, our main question is whether the
shadow of the past and the shadow of the future ‘‘work
better’’ (in the sense that they prevent problems in
buyer–supplier relations) when the inter-organisational
relations are based on individuals instead of organisations.We ﬁrst discuss the theoretical framework employed: (1)
the transaction cost economics and (2) the role of social
embeddedness. The hypotheses are then formulated, where
the centre of our attention is on the effects of the shadow of
the past and the shadow of the future. Our base-line
hypothesis is that a shared (positive) past and expected
future business will decrease the eventual number and
severity of problems in buyer–supplier relations. The next
section describes the data set we used to test our
hypotheses. The data consist of 448 contractor–subcon-
tractor transactions in the Dutch construction industry.
The conclusions and recommendations follow after the
results of the analysis, employing both ordinary least
squares estimation and 3-stage least squares.
2. Theory: transaction cost economics and social
embeddedness
In Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), following
Commons (1934), the (purchasing) transaction is the basic
unit of analysis (Williamson, 1975). An economic govern-
ance structure is according to Williamson (1981, p. 1544)
the explicit or implicit contractual framework within which
a transaction is located. The original deﬁnition of transac-
tion costs—‘costs of running the economic system’ (Arrow,
1969, p. 48)—could then be reformulated following
Macneil (1981, p. 62) as ‘costs of running the contractual
relation’. In principle, only four possible economic
governance structures—types of contracts—are available
for a single transaction or a series of purchasing transac-
tions. Which governance situation is suitable, depends on
the size of the transaction costs given certain transaction
characteristics.
We are aware that when TCE describes various
governance structures, it uses in line with its neo-classical
pedigree, the following two assumptions about human
behaviour: people behave in accordance with bounded
rationality and are guided by their own inclinations for
opportunistic behaviour and the anticipation of opportu-
nistic behaviour by other actors involved in the transac-
tion. For the rest, the criterion for organising transactions
is assumed to be the strictly instrumental one of cost and
risk minimising or revenue optimising. In this light, we say
that economic phenomena originating from the economic
structure like decreasing margins, falling proﬁts and
market shares, new entrants, new innovations by compe-
titors, or tightening shareholder’s demands increases the
drive to ‘cheat’, ‘manoeuvre’ or show opportunistic
behaviour. At the same time, the various contract forms
have to regulate this properly by arranging for effective
deterrents.
An economic analysis such as in TCE neglects the
identity and role of past relations—‘shadow of the past’—of
individual transactions. The existence of personal relations
in all real-life transactions and the widespread preference
for transacting with individuals of known reputation and
successful prior experiences raises serious problems for a
ARTICLE IN PRESS
D.-J.F. Kamann et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 12 (2006) 28–3830TCE analysis and limits its accuracy. In addition to the
main economic—contractual—governance structures, a
richer apparatus of classiﬁcation is needed, that includes
the way in which persons relate to each other—the contact
patterns or ‘social governance’.
An answer to these problems comes from sociology. As
mentioned by Rooks et al. (2005), classical sociology
(Durkheim, 1893: Book I, Chapter 7; Weber, 1921: 409),
the sociology of law (see Macaulay’s seminal 1963 study
and the ‘‘law and society’’ approach building on Macau-
lay’s work), and more recently the new economic sociology
(see Smelser and Swedberg, 1994 for a representative
overview) have provided arguments that can be used to
generate hypotheses on how problems and performance in
transactions depend on embeddedness. Integrating trans-
action cost economics and sociology, ‘contracts’ and
‘contacts’ can be seen as two different roles from the
perspective of framing theory (Lindenberg, 1993) or—from
a dialectic perspective—as opposite forces with ‘organisa-
tion man’ as the synthesis: the ‘socio-economic’ governance
structure.
Applying this to purchasing transactions, we assume that
next to the ‘contract’, purchasing transactions in real life
are embedded in relations of different contents: they are
socially embedded (Macaulay, 1963; Ouchi, 1980). Macau-
lay (1963) refers to this as the ‘non-contractual relations in
business’. This social embeddedness also creates a certain
degree of protection and control over the purchasing
transaction process. For, social relations between actors
inﬂuence the process of purchasing transactions and vice
versa. Social embeddedness can be seen as an addition to—
or even as a substitute for—the contract. The actions of the
organisational actors are interdependent, and, these actors
take on specialised roles and develop behavioural expecta-
tions of each other over time (Van de Ven, 1976). Once
purchasing relationships are established, patterns of inter-
action are likely to persist given that this persistence of
interaction patterns reduces uncertainty for the actors
involved (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In this context it is
not surprising that Granovetter (1985: p. 504) suggests a
careful and systematic attention to the actual patterns of
interpersonal relations that are present in transactions. As
stated elsewhere (Kamann and Welling, 2004), this implies
that proper functioning of actors at a micro level depends
on a proper set of contacts—embedded in relations and
activities—both within organisations and outside; both
work related and non-work related. Proper functioning of
the organisation depends on proper relations viewed as (1)
a collection of all contact patterns of the individual
members of the organisation; (2) all institutionalised
relations with outside actors, the organisation has.1 Paying1We refer to institutional actors in the selection environment , task
environment or any of what might be called ‘‘STEPE actors’’ (Johnson
and Scholes, 1984/2002; Kamann, 1988/2003): trade unions, stakeholders
but also suppliers who have a long term contract but where the acting
purchasing ofﬁcer in charge has been replaced as a result of job rotation.
In the case of STEPE actors, there may be a shadow of the past at theattention to contact patterns will also enable us to
comprehend the various complex intermediate forms
between idealised atomic markets and completely inte-
grated ﬁrms. An example is the ‘quasi-firm’ for the
construction industry as described by Eccles (1981) and
Constantino and Pietroforte (2001).
Summarising a lengthy discussion on the processes of
conditioning, matching, mental map and goal congruen-
cies, contagion and selection (cf. Kamann, 1994, 1995,
1999; Kamann and Bakker, 2004), we argue that a shared
past strengthens the personal relationship between the so-
called organisational boundary spanners. Attitudes, values,
and goals get more similar and mutual ‘trust’2 in one
another increases. As a result, a shared past positively
affects partners’ predisposition to help one another out by
committing their organisations to a purchasing relation-
ship, while refraining from opportunistic behaviour (Van
de Ven, 1976). ‘Time’ seems to be a vital incubator
precondition for growing ‘trust’ and ‘goal congruence’; two
key elements in creating cooperative behaviour (cf. Ford,
2002). For that reason, we incorporate the temporal
embeddedness of contacts into our frame of reference
(cf. Heide and Miner, 1992; Noordewier et al, 1990): we use
the term ‘shadow of the past’ to reﬂect the existence of a
common past, the shadow of the future refers to the
likelihood that actors meet again in the future. Using the
term shadow of the past, we assumed—as was supported
by 28 interviews with project managers—that purchasing
organisations (or individuals) have strong preferences for
doing business with partners that they have certain prior
experiences. This assumption is theoretically based on Van
de Ven (1976) who stated that, over time, successful
purchasing relationships tend to become meshed together
in a web of interdependencies.
One way to understand why a shadow of the future
might be beneﬁcial is that for a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy to work
there must be a large enough probability that there actually
is a next round to sanction a present ‘tat’ with a future ‘tit’.
Opportunistic behaviour becomes tempting and attractive
in the case of spot market exchange. In general, we argue
that cooperative behaviour in buyer–supplier relations is
more likely, the more likely it is that business partners will
meet in the future (Axelrod, 1984; Batenburg et al., 2003).
In social life, individuals are likely to meet people they
interact with in the future. This means that the shadow of
the future is a normal part of social relations among
members of a social group. However, in organisations, a
different situation occurs. It is no longer clear whether the
beneﬁts of having past and likely recurrent interaction
relate to relations between individuals or to relations(footnote continued)
individual level; in the case of job rotation, there is no ‘shadow of the past’
at the individual level. In both cases, there is a shadow of the past at the
organisational level.
2‘Trust’ is used here in its meaning of ‘lack of opportunism’, ‘good
faith’, or ‘willingness to share more strategic information’ (cf. Kamann,
1988/2003).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
D.-J.F. Kamann et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 12 (2006) 28–38 31between organisations. As stated in our introduction, we
separate these two levels of aggregation: the micro level of
the individual project manager and/or purchasing manager
and the macro level of the organisation.3
It should be noted that transaction cost theory as such
does not focus on explaining performance. Rather, TCE
asks how transaction characteristics affect the ‘‘govern-
ance’’ of a transaction. Roughly, the idea is that the
characteristics of a transaction—one usually distinguishes
asset speciﬁcity, uncertainty and estimated frequency of the
transaction in future—affect the risks associated with a
transaction. These risks then determine the way in which a
transaction will be (or should be) governed. Hence,
‘‘governance’’ refers to the measures actors involved in
an exchange use or implement in order to mitigate risks
and therefore also to improve performance. Transaction
cost theory thus tries to explain ex ante governance and,
speciﬁcally, contractual features of governance (such as
which kinds of contract are used), under the assumption
that the governance of a transaction is subject to
economising behaviour of exchange partners. Similar to
Rooks et al. (2005), we assume that transaction character-
istics affect performance directly through incentive effects
for suppliers as well as indirectly through contractual
governance that anticipates on performance effects. Since
contractual governance is costly, economizing on contrac-
tual ex ante governance will typically not eliminate all risks
associated with the transaction so that problems and less
than optimal supplier performance are likely to occur.
In general the probability of cooperation problems to
actually occur is determined by (1) the potential to behave
opportunistically (in some cases there is more room to
misbehave than in others); (2) the economic need to behave
opportunistically (under some conditions, any ﬁrm or
person is more likely to misbehave) and (3) by the general
personal propensity to behave opportunistically (some ﬁrms
or people are by ‘nature’ more inclined to misbehave). We
acknowledge that a focus on the individual level brings us
dangerously close to a detailed analysis on individual
differences with respect to opportunistic behaviour,
whereas one would in general prefer to be reluctant to
include explanations in a business context that delve too
deeply into the psychological particularities of each and
every individual. The focus of our analysis, however, is
solely on the effects of temporal embeddedness on
cooperation problems between buyer–supplier relation-
ships.3. Hypotheses
As our dependent variable we consider the amount and
degree of problems that occur in buyer–supplier relation-
ships. Problem in the sense of ‘‘anything that delayed the3One could argue about whether the term macro level should be
reserved for the level of the sector, as is customary in industrial
organisation (cf. Kamann, 1988/2003).construction project, increased costs or otherwise was not
foreseen and experienced as normal business behaviour as
to be expected’’. TCE offers many independent variables
that could have an effect on the amount and degree of
experienced problems. In our empirical analysis we will
indeed control for several characteristics of the product or
service, characteristics of the buyer, the supplier, and of the
context in which they operate. However, our centre of
attention in this paper is the effect of the shadow of the
past and the shadow of the future. The base-line hypothesis
is that a shared (positive) past and expected future business
decreases the problems in buyer–supplier relations.
Basic hypothesis [shadow of the past]: In buyer–supplier
relations where buyer and supplier have conducted
business before, less problems will emerge in the focal
transaction.
Basic hypothesis [shadow of the future]: The more buyer
and supplier expect to conduct future business with each
other, the less problems will emerge in the focal
transaction.
However, usually this hypothesis is theoretically argued
and tested (e.g. Gulati, 1995) on the level of organisations.
As outlined above, we hypothesize that this effect will hold
stronger if one would consider the shared past and
expected future for individuals instead of the organisations
they represent.
Extension of the basic hypothesis [shadow of the past]: In
buyer–supplier relations where buyer and supplier have
done business before on the individual level, even less
problems will emerge as compared to when buyer and
supplier have done business before on the organisational
level.
Extension of the basic hypothesis [shadow of the future]:
The more buyer and supplier expect to do business with
each other on the individual level, the less problems will
emerge. This effect is stronger than in the case where
buyer and supplier expect future business on the
organisational level.
4. Data
As our sampling frame we decided to focus on the Dutch
construction industry, for a combination of reasons. First,
the construction industry is characterised by short-term
inter-organisational relations between partners in con-
struction (contractors, subcontractors, architects, etc).
This poses high demands on mutual communication and
coordination (Voordijk, 1994, p. 88). If we look at
construction projects more closely, we see that these
relations between organisations usually come about by a
series of (hierarchical) bilateral agreements and sub-
contracts (Jacobs et al., 1992). With bilateral agreements
we mean that partners in construction make separate
agreements with the main contractor, without much
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the different construction partners do not depend on each
other. On the contrary, one of the consequences is that
construction partners are ‘‘sentenced by the main contract’’
to work together in the construction process (Jacobs et al.,
1992, p. 96 and further).
Although the nature of the business is project-like, long-
term relations between organisations can arise. Not because
of ofﬁcial partnerships, but because of the fact that ﬁrms in
future projects will meet again, and know that they will need
similar business partners. This is what Eccles (1981) called
the quasi-firm in the construction industry. As Constantino
and Pietroforte (2001) reconﬁrm, the construction process
can be concerned to be a typical ‘‘network industry’’.
Although usually organisations are considered to be
separate entities (‘‘corporate actors’’), we want to focus
explicitly on the relations between the individuals. Accord-
ing to research by the Dutch EIB (2004, p.12; Economic
Institute for the Construction Industry, in Dutch: Econo-
misch Instituut voor de Bouwnijverheid), only 15% of the
individuals working in construction never cooperate with
individuals from other organisations. On the other hand, it
seems that the frequency with which individuals work
together with individuals from other organisations could
be rather low (Geerink, 1998, p. 60).
These facts, together with the heated debate in (not only
Dutch) construction about cooperation problems and
opportunistic behaviour, make the construction industry
an interesting test ground for our hypotheses. Individuals
and their ﬁrms are connected in a network of (sometimes
short-term) cooperative relations, and the project-like
structure of cooperation puts high demands on coordina-
tion, communication, and gives ample opportunities for
opportunistic behaviour.
We decide to use a questionnaire to be able to test our
hypotheses for their validity across the industry. As the basis
for the questionnaire, we used the MAT98 data collection
(see Buskens and Batenburg, 2000), a survey speciﬁcally
geared at cooperative relations in the IT-industry, but easily
adaptable for our purpose. This MAT data set has been
used to test hypotheses on how transaction characteristics,
embeddedness and contracting affect supplier performance
in transactions between buyers—all small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) and IT-suppliers (cf. Rooks, 2002;
Rooks et al., 2005). An English version of this questionnaire
is available (Buskens and Batenburg, 2000).
The questionnaire was divided into seven parts, roughly
following a contractor–subcontractor transaction chron-
ologically:1. what kind of purchasing transaction was this (questions
on the characteristics of the transaction,2. the choice of subcontractor (questions on search and
selection of the subcontractor),3. the relationship with the chosen subcontractor (question
on, among others, the temporal embeddedness of the
contractor–subcontractor dyad)4. the agreement with the subcontractor (questions on kind
and content of the agreement, the degree of detail in the
agreement, etc.),5. the result of the transaction (question on kind and
severity of problems encountered)6. the transaction as part of a larger project (question on
the position of the transaction in a larger construction
project), and7. the respondent (questions on the respondent him/
herself, the company they work for, etc.).
For a transaction to be appropriate for subsequent
questioning, it had to fulﬁl the following three require-
ments:1. the transaction had to be recently completed (so that we
could assess the kind and degree of problems in full),2. the respondent should be aware of all ins and outs of the
purchasing transaction, and3. the value of the purchasing transaction should exceed
5000 Euro.
Ten different experts in the ﬁeld of construction, all with
experience in purchasing in construction and contractor–-
subcontractor relations in construction, commented on the
ﬁrst version of the questionnaire. Moreover, experts from
the Dutch Economic Institute for the Construction
Industry (EIB: Economisch Instituut voor de Bouwnijver-
heid), an institute that has years of experience in designing
and running surveys in the construction industry, also
commented on the questionnaire. Filling out a question-
naire took about 30min on average. The questionnaire was
considered to be ‘‘clear’’ and ‘‘certainly to the point’’. Some
changes were made in language and wording to make some
questions ﬁt the ‘‘construction industry language’’ better.
Our questionnaire on transactions between contractors and
subcontractors in the construction industry is available as a
PDF document (in Dutch); an English codebook is being
prepared and available on request. As much as possible, we
used questions that ask for objective facts (‘‘Have you done
business before with this company?,’’ ‘‘Was a written
contract used?,’’ ‘‘Who [largely] designed the contract?,’’
‘‘Which of the following problems did you encounter in
this transaction?,’’ etc.).
We collected data about 448 contractor–subcontractor
relations. Contractors were contacted by telephone and
invited to participate in an online survey on ‘‘cooperation
between contractor and subcontractors in the construction
industry’’. No speciﬁc reference was made as to what the
precise topic of the survey was. Participation was
voluntary, no speciﬁc rewards were promised or given
other than that we offered a summary of the results to
those who were interested. The telephone numbers were
taken from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce
database—2004, and we stratiﬁed our sample with respect
to a) the type of construction project [‘‘GWW vs. B&U’’: in
Dutch ‘‘Grond- Weg en Waterbouw,’’ which are typically
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Infrastructural worksa 55 52 42 1
Housing, Ofﬁces and
Factoriesb
122 83 69 1
Other 4 10 5 4
Total: 448 181 145 116 6
aIn Dutch: GWW-sector (Grond Weg & Waterbouw).
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Total number of problems  encountered 
151413121110
Fig. 1. Total number of problems encountered in contractor-subcon-
tractor cooperations ðN ¼ 448Þ. In 38% of the cases, no problems were
encountered. The maximum number of problems encountered was 15.
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bouw,’’ which are typically private projects] and b) the
contractor’s ﬁrm size [less than 20, 20–100, more than 100].
In total, 3612 phone calls were made with contractors in
the construction industry with an online (e-mail) connec-
tion. From these 3612 contractors, 1984 declared to be
willing to participate (55%). These subjects were sent an
invitation to ﬁll out an online questionnaire. From these
invitations N ¼ 448 completed questionnaires were re-
ceived (23%). Table 1 gives an overview of our sample. The
median value of a transaction in our data is 29,000 Euro.
5. Results
As our dependent variable, we consider the amount and
degree of problems that the contractor and subcontractor
were confronted with. After extensive consultation with
experts in the ﬁeld, we developed a survey that asked
whether 23 potential problems had occurred (and whether
they could in principal occur for this transaction), ranging
from discussion about on time delivery, not meeting the
agreed speciﬁcations, discussion about tidiness on the work
site, and about not supplying the paper work on time. For
all these items, we asked for answers on a 5-point Likert
scale (1 ¼ problem did not occur, 2 ¼ was a minor issue,
3 ¼ was somewhat of a problem, 4 ¼ was a problem, 5 ¼
was a big problem) and also gave respondents the
opportunity to indicate that the potential problem was
simply inappropriate given the transaction. We coded this
as a zero (since, given that the problem was inappropriate
for that particular transaction, it obviously did not arise).
There are then several ways in which one can measure the
‘‘total amount’’ of problems. We consider three. First, we
dichotomised all items and count any item with a score of 3
or more as a problem, and then add all items to get the
total number of problems encountered. Second, we recoded
all zeroes to ones, and then averaged the score across all
items. Third, for each case, we counted the number of
problem items that the respondent deemed appropriate for
that particular transaction. We then know that the
maximum ‘‘amount’’ of problems one could experience is
that number times 5, the maximum on the scale. Wesubsequently calculated the total score for the appropriate
problems and divided this by the maximum amount, to get
a percentage score: the percentage of problems that has
materialised, taking into account that not all problems in
the list of 23 possible problems can materialise. To get a
feel for the data, we show in Fig. 1 the number of problems
that were encountered using the ﬁrst way of measurement:
a simple count of the total number of problems. In 38% of
the cases, no problems of a substantial matter were
encountered. The worst case in our data is a case where
problems were experienced on all 15 different dimensions.
The three different ways to measure the problems
experienced show relatively strong correlations (the lowest
is 0.73 between the second and third measure), and in any
case our results do not depend on the choice of dependent
variable. We report our subsequent analyses based on all
three measurements.
Table 2 shows an overview of the kinds of problems that
were most prevalent in our data. It appears that preciseness
and tidiness of the work is mentioned most often, together
with discussions about the price for extra work (or the
discount for less work), when the work should start and be
ﬁnished, and the delivery time.
Although our main emphasis is on the effects of
temporal embeddedness of relations between organisations
and individuals, in all analyses we control for a number of
other, possibly relevant variables that might intervene with
our results. Here we do not go into the details of these
variables; most are based on standard arguments from
transaction cost theory. We control for variables such as
the (natural log of) the price of the product or service, the
price relative to the total project price, the experience with
the subcontracting of similar products or services, how
many other suppliers were available (if any), whether the
subcontracting concerned a product delivery or a service,
and the investment in transaction management (see the




Overview of the percentage of contractor–subcontractor transactions that
experienced a particular problem (N ¼ 448)
Average percent time Type of problem occurred:
Problem occurred
(%)
23.6 Discussion about preciseness and tidiness of the
work
21.6 Discussion about price of extra/less work
21.2 Discussion about when work should start and
ﬁnish
17.8 Discussion about delivery time
15.8 Tender not as agreed upon
14.9 Discussion about completeness of tender
12.9 Discussion about sending enough employees to
the work site
11.1 Discussion about quality, Arbo, or safety and
environmental issues
10.0 Discussion about quantities delivered/used
9.8 Discussion about cleaning up the construction
site
9.3 Discussion about changing personnel on work
site
9.1 Construction plans late or wrong
8.9 Discussion about payment or payment scheme
8.9 Discussion about dealing with complaints after
ﬁnal payment
8.2 Discussion about general agreement scheme
(‘‘Algemene voorwaarden’’)
5.3 Discussion about the use of tools and
machinery
5.3 Discussion about warranties and/or
maintenance
4.4 Discussion about late or inaccurate delivery of
‘‘wka’’ data etc
3.5 Discussion about subcontracting or ‘‘ZZP’’-
employees
2.0 Discussion about using foreign employees
2.0 Discussion about taking care of a warranty of
the bank (‘‘bankgarantie’’)
1.7 Subcontractor worked on the basis of wrong
design plans








Fig. 2. Schematic overview of how investments in transaction manage-
ment are endogenous in explaining the amount and degree of problems.
(footnote continued)
that in this case this assumption is in fact violated, but only for the cases in
which a written contract was used, not for the cases where all matters were
arranged orally.
5Actually, since whether or not a contract is used is an endogenous
D.-J.F. Kamann et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 12 (2006) 28–3834The fact that we are looking at problems as our
dependent variable and control in our analysis for the
investment in management necessitates a speciﬁc statistical
strategy. What we are interested in is the ‘net’ effect of
investments in purchasing management on the amount and
degree of problems, while taking into account the fact that
management itself is also determined by characteristics of
the transaction, the contractor, the subcontractor, etc. This
poses a methodological problem: one of the predictors of
the amount and degree of problems is itself endogenously
determined, and this implies that employing standard
regression techniques is not likely to deliver valid
inferences.4 However, such models can be adequately4For triangular models such as this one, we could use standard
regression techniques only when the residuals in the estimation equation
for the investment in management are not related to the residuals in the
estimation equation of the amount and degree of problems. Tests showestimated using different variants of ‘‘instrumental variable
regression’’ (including 2-Stage-Least-Squares and 3-Stage-
Least-Squares, Zellner and Theil, 1962; Johnston and
Dinardo, 1997; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). We
control for transaction characteristics (complexity of
product, hardware vs. software, whether there were any
monitoring problems for the buyer, the switching costs
involved, etc), and buyer and supplier characteristics (size
and reputation of the supplier, whether buyer and supplier
had done business before, degree of dependency on the
supplier, etc.). Fig. 2 summarizes this view on the way in
which characteristics of the transaction affect the amount
and degree of problems both directly and indirectly
through investments in transaction management.
An important ﬁnding in our data is that a written
contract is only used in 75% of the cases. The other 25% of
the cases are not governed by any written agreement
(at least not between the contractor and the subcontractor).
Closer inspection of the data show that this happens
precisely in those cases where it is to be expected: it
happens more often in those cases where contractor and
subcontractor are organisations of a smaller size (typically
less than 5 employees), when on-time delivery is not so
much of an issue, when it considers a delivery (as opposed
to a service) and monitoring problems are not very severe.
We will run our analyses on the effects of temporal
embeddedness separately for the cases with and without
contract.5
Our variables measuring the shared past (and future) are
split in two. First, we deﬁne a dummy-variable that is equal
to one if either [1] the two individuals (one from the
contractor and the key-contact at the subcontractor) have
conducted business before or [2] the individual from the
contractor has conducted business with the subcontractor
organisation before. Second, we deﬁne a dummy that is
equal to one if the contractor and subcontractor organisa-
tion have conducted business before, but the individual atdecision, it would be better to model it as a separate decision and take this
into account in the data analysis. Given the complications of such an
analysis, we will not do this here. It would therefore be more accurate to
state that we analyze the effects of temporal embeddedness on the amount
and degree of problems, given that contractor and subcontractor have
chosen whether or not to use a written contract.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 3
Cross-tabs of the existence of an individual past and an organisational
(but not individual) past, separate for transactions arranged with and
without a written contract
Written contract Written contract
No Yes No Yes
Ind. Past No 22 92 Strictly org. past No 99 317
Yes 83 246 Yes 6 21
Ind. Future No 20 71 Strictly org. future No 103 319
Yes 85 267 Yes 2 19
D.-J.F. Kamann et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 12 (2006) 28–38 35the contractor has not conducted business before with the
sub-contractor organisation. The same applies for the
deﬁnition of a shared future. Table 3 shows cross-tabs of
these variables for cases with and without a written
contract.
It appears that it might be difﬁcult to ﬁnd results, even if
they are present in the data and the population, given the
above. To test our extended hypotheses, our statistical
power has to come from the cases where a shared
organisational past or future exists, but not an individual
past or future. There are, however, comparatively little
cases in our data that have a strict organisational past or
future (27 for past, 21 for future, about 5% of the cases). It
turns out that business contacts in the construction
industry is indeed a ‘‘network industry’’ in the sense
mentioned in our introduction and theoretical section, but
it is even a bit more of a individual network industry than
we had hoped for our analytical purposes. With that in
mind, we now turn to our analyses.
Tables 4(a) and (b) show the results of our analyses
explaining the amount and degree of problems. We present
results separately for the cases where a written contract was
used and for the cases where a written contract was not
used.
Table 4(a) shows the results of three three-stage least
squares analyses for the cases where a written contract was
used; one for every operationalisation of the dependent
problems-variable. Since in three-stage least squares we do
not only try to predict the dependent variable (problems)
from independent variables, but simultaneously try to
predict the endogenous independent variable (investment
in contracting), each analysis covers two columns of the
table (one column for problems, one for contracting). Our
emphasis is on the columns with the different measures for
problems as the dependent variable. We ﬁnd, among
others, that larger investments in contracting go together
with less problems. Problems increase with the price of the
product or service, and product deliveries are less proble-
matic than services.
The effects of temporal embeddedness are strange when
it comes to a shared past. None of these effects are
signiﬁcant and in any case in an unexpected direction:
relations with a past experience (non-signiﬁcantly) moreproblems. This clearly not only contradicts our basic
hypothesis, but also does not give support to our extended
hypothesis. The effects of the shadow of the future are in
the right direction. One should recall here that the number
of cases we have available for these variables is small,
but we still ﬁnd a borderline signiﬁcant effect (p ¼ 0:052,
2-sided) for the shadow of an individual future. The effect
of the shadow of the organisational future is smaller and in
fact not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Given the small
number it is not surprising that the difference between the
organisational and individual shared future is not sig-
niﬁcant ðp ¼ 0:32Þ. Nevertheless, here we indeed see a case
where if we would consider an organisational past only, we
would likely not ﬁnd an effect of the shadow of the future,
whereas we do if one considers the individual shared
future.
Table 4(b) shows the results for an ordinary least squares
analyses for the cases where no written contract was used.
In this case, closer inspection of the data revealed that the
endogeneity problem that called for three-stage least
squares analysis in Table 4(a), was not that severe. In
Table 4(b) we again show analyses for all three operatio-
nalisations of the problem-variable, and present an
additional analysis that includes several control variables.
Once again the ﬁndings for the shared past are the most
puzzling. We now do ﬁnd the expected negative effect of a
shared past on purchasing for two of the three operatio-
nalisations. However, across all but one of the analyses, the
effect of the organisational past is stronger than that of the
individual past. The effects of the shared future are roughly
similar to the results for the cases with the written
contracts. Since the number of cases is even smaller, we
do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects, which is to be expected, but
effect sizes are similar. The effect of a shared individual
future is stronger in all but one analysis than that of the
organisational shared future.
Getting back to our hypotheses, our data show that we
do not ﬁnd much support for effects of a shared past. All in
all, both the basic and the extended hypothesis on having a
shared past is not supported by the data. However, we do
ﬁnd evidence for the fact that a shared individual future is a
more important predictor for problems in the cooperation
between contractor and subcontractor, than the shared
organisational future.6. Conclusion and discussion
We set out by stating—as others have done—that it
would make sense to combine the strict economic inter-
pretation of transaction cost economics with elements that
introduce a relational character to cooperation between
business partners. Our main focus was on the effects of
temporal embeddedness: the effects of business partners
having a shared past and/or expecting a shared future.
Whereas most researchers have left the level of analysis for
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D.-J.F. Kamann et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 12 (2006) 28–38 37disentangle effects of an individual shared past and future
from those of an organisational shared past and future.
Our data, business transactions between contractors and
subcontractors sampled from the Dutch construction
industry, showed some interesting ﬁndings. First, it makes
sense to distinguish between cases that are governed by a
written contract, versus those that are governed by oral
agreement only. We indeed ﬁnd that, at least for the
smaller and more unproblematic transactions, oral agree-
ments are used (and relatively successful). Our ﬁndings do
not support an effect of a shared past, individual or
organisational, on the probability of problems in the
transaction. Only for the cases where no written contract
was used, there is some support for an effect of an
organisational past.
However, our results may indeed shed some light on the
mixed ﬁndings in the literature concerning the alleged effect
of a shared future. We ﬁnd that although an expected
shared organisational future has only marginal effects (if
any) on the probability of problems in the present
transaction, an expected shared individual future does show
a small but signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of
problems. This ﬁnding is robust across operationalisations.
Future research should make clear precisely when this
difference matters and how much, but this study is a ﬁrst
and successful attempt to show that it can make a
difference if relational embeddedness is deﬁned at the
organisational or the individual level.
Several weak points of our study need to be emphasised
here. First, we only collected data through the contractor,
not through the subcontractor, which may have an impact
on our results. Second, our sampling frame is not really
clear. We asked respondents to choose a transaction that
had recently been completed, and with which they were
well acquainted. It is therefore not really clear what the
sampling population is, and one should take this into
account when interpreting the results. Third, although the
(to us somewhat surprising) ﬁnding that a relatively large
part of the smaller and unproblematic transactions are not
governed by contracts at all, is interesting in itself, it does
suggest that one could improve both the theoretical and
empirical modelling by explicitly incorporating the decision
to use or not use a contract in the decision process.
7. Implications for practitioners
The main practical implication for practitioners lies in
the emphasis on possible other ways, relational ways, to
safeguard cooperation between business partners. Whereas
it might be tempting to safeguard a transaction solely by
‘‘economic means,’’ such as through elaborate contracts
and planning, it is worthwhile to explicitly take the
relationship with the business partner into account. A
mutual expectation of future business is a useful asset in the
sense that it is less likely that partners will behave
opportunistically or perform badly, and can be seen as a
complementary and relatively cheap way to make sure thatbusiness runs smoothly. Our results suggest that ﬁxed and
stable individual contacts with the supplier ﬁrm limit
coordination and transaction costs and enhance long-run
supplier performance, thereby reducing the likelihood of
annoying and costly problems on a day to day basis.References
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